(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state:
(1) the claim, offense, or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;
(2) information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
(i) the identity, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time, and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
(d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).
 It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.
 Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings involving juveniles, domestic relations, mental disabilities, and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance with such Rules.
 The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer’s making statements that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. Recognizing that the public value of informed commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small, the Rule applies only to lawyers and their associates who are, or who have been, involved in the investigation or litigation of a case.
 Paragraph (b) identifies specific matters about which a lawyer’s statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice and should not in any event be considered prohibited by the general prohibition of paragraph (a). Paragraph (b) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement, but statements on other matters will be governed by paragraph (a).
 There are, on the other hand, certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter, or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. These subjects relate to the following matters:
(1) the character, credibility, reputation, or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation, or witness; the identity of a witness; or the expected testimony of a party or witness;
(2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by a defendant or suspect, or that person’s refusal or failure to make a statement;
(3) the performance or results of any examination or test; the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test; or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;
(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; or
(5) information that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and that would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial.
 Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Nonjury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule still places limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding.
 Finally, extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party’s lawyer, or third persons, but only if a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid substantial prejudice to the lawyer’s client. In some situations, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding resulting from the prejudicial statements made publicly by others. Such responsive statements should be limited to contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others.
 See Rule 3.8(e) for additional duties of prosecutors in connection with extrajudicial statements about criminal proceedings.
Rule 3.8: Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The prosecutor in a criminal matter:
(a) shall refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause; and
(b) shall make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel; and
(c) shall not advise an unrepresented accused to waive important pretrial rights; and
(d) shall make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, shall disclose to the defense and, if the defendant is proceeding pro se, to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal; and
(1) exercise reasonable care to prevent employees of the prosecutor’s office from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6; and
(2) discourage investigators, law enforcement personnel, and other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor in a criminal matter from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6; and
(f) shall not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a client or former client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.
 A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice whose duty is to seek justice rather than merely to advocate for the State’s victory at any given cost. SeeState v. Superior Oil, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tenn. 1994). For example, “prosecutors are expected to be impartial in the sense that charging decisions should be based upon the evidence, without discrimination or bias for or against any groups or individuals. Yet, at the same time, they are expected to prosecute criminal offenses with zeal and vigor within the bounds of the law and professional conduct.” SeeState v. Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tenn. 2000). A knowing disregard of these obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4.
 Paragraph (c) does not apply to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal. Nor does it forbid the lawful questioning of a suspect who has knowingly waived the right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination.
 The exception in paragraph (d) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.
 Paragraph (f) is intended to limit the issuance of lawyer subpoenas in grand jury and other criminal proceedings to those situations in which there is a genuine need to intrude into the client-lawyer relationship.
 See Rule 3.6 for the rules governing extrajudicial statements by prosecutors and other lawyers participating in the investigation or litigation of a matter.
Office of the District Attorney General
Washington Square, Suite 500
222 2nd Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201 - 1649
Office Hours: 8:00 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. M - F
Phone (615) 862-5500 | Fax (615) 862-5599